




The expressivist advances a view about how we explain the meaning of a
fragment of language, such as claims about what we morally ought to do.
Critics evaluate expressivism on those terms. This is a serious mistake. We
don’t just use that fragment of language in isolation. We make claims about
what we morally, legally, rationally, and prudentially ought to do. To
account for this linguistic phenomenon, the expressivist owes us an account
not just of each fragment of language, but of how they weave together into a
broader tapestry.
The linguistic phenomenon in question is the relativity of normative terms
to standards. In the same circumstances, one act can count as what we “ought
to do” relative to one standard (e.g. morality) and what we “ought not do”
relative to another (e.g. legality). We see the same phenomenon with descrip-
tive terms: in the same circumstances, one entity can count as “tall” relative to
one standard and “not tall” relative to another. Such claims are consistent, and
have different contents. However this does not show that “ought” (or “tall”) is
lexically ambiguous. Rather, “ought,” like “tall,” has a single standing meaning,
or character, which systematically determines those different contents.
Historically, the expressivist neglected this phenomenon. She offered an
explanation of the contents of terms like “ought” in one fragment of
language. She provided no explanation of the character of normative terms
like “ought.”
In §11.2, I explain why the expressivist must explain the character of
“ought” across all varieties of normativity—i.e. across all standards to which
“ought” is relativized. Such an explanation is required for two reasons. First,
if “ought” had different contents but no single character, it would have a
different meaning in moral, legal, rational, and prudential claims. There is
no evidence for this prediction of widespread lexical ambiguity, and much
evidence against it. So the expressivist needs an account of the character of
“ought” if it is to be consistent with the linguistic data. Second, without
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such an explanation, expressivism will lack the parsimony and explanatory
power of its “descriptivist” competitors.
There are two ways that the expressivist could explain the character of
“ought”: at the semantic level, or at the meta-semantic level. I consider the
first in §11.3. The best option here builds on work by Allan Gibbard.
However, it gets the wrong results about inconsistency: it makes claims
about what we morally ought to do inconsistent with claims about what we
legally, prudentially, or rationally ought to do. This problem with incon-
sistency, I argue, afflicts plausible alternatives to this expressivist semantics.
In §11.4, I consider whether meta-semantic expressivists can explain the
character of “ought.” The best option here was developed by Michael Ridge.
But it leaves expressivists with an implausibly disunifiedmeta-semantics: there
are two different explanations for why “ought” has one meaning. There is no
good way for meta-semantic expressivists to avoid this problematic disunity.
If this is right, the expressivist faces a challenge. She must provide an
explanation of the character of “ought,” but has no good way to do so. My
hypothesis is that to explain the univocality of “ought,” the expressivist must
posit that “ought” expresses the same type of conative attitude when it is
relativized to varieties of normativity; but once she posits that, no matter how
we fill in the details of her view we encounter a general problem in explaining
inconsistency because attitudinal inconsistency is too coarse-grained. I use
this hypothesis to frame the present challenge to expressivism as a dilemma in
§11.5. In §11.6 I note that by construing her view as a pragmatic thesis the
expressivist can evade both horns of the dilemma; but this is a Pyrrhic victory,
since it does not vindicate anti-realist commitments about normativity.
As Seth Yalcin (2012) noted, expressivism has been “so unmoored from
linguistic phenomena [that] it is unsurprising that there is little agreement
concerning what the expressivist’s linguistic programme is, or should be.”
This can make expressivism an elusive target. My aim here is to draw our
attention to a linguistic phenomenon that the expressivist has neglected in
order to throw down a gauntlet; my aim is not to offer an impossibility
proof. Perhaps some form of expressivism avoids both horns of the dilemma
while vindicating anti-realism. If so, progress will still have been made: we
will at least have reached some agreement about what the expressivist’s
linguistic program should be.
11.1 SETTING THE STAGE
We should not proceed unmoored. So what is this linguistic phenomenon?
And what are “content” and “character,” “descriptivism” and “expressivism”?
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11.1.1 The Linguistic Phenomenon
Consider Sophocles’ Antigone. After her brother Polynices was killed in
battle, Creon—the king of Thebes—forbids Antigone to bury him, on
pain of death by stoning. Say that Antigone and Creon discuss what she
ought to do:
1. Morally, I ought to bury Polynices, but legally I ought not do so.
2. No, morally and legally, you ought not bury Polynices.
In saying (1), Antigone takes morality and legality to be divergent standards:
the same act in the same circumstances (“burying Polynices”) is what she
“ought to do” relative to one standard (morality) and what she “ought not
do” relative to another (legality). In saying (2), Creon takes morality and
legality to be convergent standards: according to both, Antigone ought not
bury Polynices.
This exchange will be our main focus. But it is synecdochic: we are using
this example to represent the wider linguistic phenomenon of standard-
relativity.We could also substitute legality for another standard, like prudence:
3. Morally, I ought to bury Polynices, but prudentially I ought not
do so.
4. No, morally and prudentially, you ought not bury Polynices.
And we could embed such relativized claims, as Creon does in the following
sentences (after the prophet Tiresias convinces him of the error of his ways):
5. Morally you ought not bury Polynices; but if you bury Polynices,
rationally I ought not blame you.
6. Legally, I ought to punish you. But morally, I should not have
made it the case that legally I ought to punish you.
It is worth noting a few intuitive and important features of such exchanges.
Antigone and Creon disagree about what she morally ought to do, but agree
about what she legally and prudentially ought to do. Moreover, they do not
disagree with themselves: it is consistent for Antigone to say that “burying
Polynices” is what she “ought to do” relative to morality, andwhat she “ought
not do” relative to legality and prudence. Ditto for Creon’s claims (5) and (6).
11.1.2 Content and Character
Now let’s distinguish between content and what Kaplan (1989) called
character. These technical terms track an intuitive distinction between
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context-variant and -invariant meaning.1 To illustrate it, consider the fol-
lowing uses of “tall”:
7. Creon is tall for a Theban, but he’s not tall for a Greek.
8. No, he’s tall for a Theban and for a Greek.
Here the same entity (“Creon”) is taken to be “tall” or “not tall” relative to
different standards (“for a Theban”; “for a Greek”). There is an intuitive
sense in which “tall” has a different meaning in the two uses in (7): one
might mean “of a height greater than 4ʹ5ʺ,” the other might mean “of a
height greater than 5ʹ5ʺ.” These are different contents of “tall.” There is also
an intuitive sense in which “tall” means the same thing in (7) and (8):
roughly, “of a degree of height greater than the average x.” This is the
character of “tall”: i.e. its standard-invariant meaning.2
The standard-relativity of the descriptive term “tall” in (7)–(8) is analo-
gous to the standard-relativity of the normative term “ought” in (1)–(2). So
by analogy, our concern is with the distinction between the contents
(standard-variant meanings) and character (standard-invariant meaning) of
“ought.”
The challenge for expressivists will be to explain the standard-invariant
meaning of “ought” (or “A ought to φ”),3 and how it systematically interacts
with standards like “morally” and “legally” to determine contents.
11.1.3 Descriptivism
Before we get there, consider the orthodox account of the character of
“tall” from representationalist, truth-conditional semantic theories. On
this account, “tall” means a function from contexts to contents, where
contents are propositions.
“Descriptivists” offer the same representational explanation for the mean-
ing of descriptive and normative terms. Following Angelika Kratzer in
particular, they take the character of “ought” to be a function from contexts
to propositions. To illustrate this approach, here is one candidate function:
1 There are different ways to cash this out: compare Kaplan (1989) and Heck (2001).
2 This is not a definition of character. It is simply the only form of invariant meaning
that concerns us.
3 For the sake of expository convenience, I will drop such parentheticals and speak of
the meaning of “ought.” Some expressivists frame their views in terms of the meaning of
sentences (“A ought to φ”). Such expressivists can translate my claims appropriately.
(They had better be able to in order to explain compositionality: see Ridge (2014),
p. 137.) They should also heed Schroeder’s (2008) point that it is easier to assign
Kaplanian characters to terms than sentences (pp. 179–80).
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Oughtf g φ = 1 iff 8w((w ∈ [[F]] \ [[G]])  w ∈ [[φ]]).
The modal base f provides a set of propositions, F, which represents the
relevant circumstances. The ordering source g provides a set of propositions,
G, which represents the demands of the relevant standard. “A ought to φ” is
true iff “A φs” is true at every world in the intersection of F and G. This
illustrates the essential innovation from Kratzer (2012): that two conversa-
tional backgrounds are relevant to modals; f determines which worlds are
accessible, while g ranks those worlds.
This account of the character of “ought” has many virtues, two of which
are dialectically important. First, it explains how the character of “ought”
systematically interacts with standards to determine contents. Second, it
provides fine-grained inconsistency conditions. (1) and (2) are inconsistent:
“Antigone buries Polynices” cannot be true and false at the intersection of
the F and G where G represents the same legal demands and F represents the
same circumstances. But the conjuncts of (1) are consistent: it can be true
that “Antigone buries Polynices” at the intersection of the F and G where G
represents the moral demands, and true that “Antigone does not bury
Polynices” at the intersection of the F and G where G represents the legal
demands.4 This explains why Antigone and Creon disagree, but Antigone
does not disagree with herself.
Of course, there are problems with and puzzles for the function above,
and truth-conditional accounts of the character of “ought” generally. Still,
such accounts are promising. And perhaps more importantly, even those
who reject them should still accept that descriptivists face no special chal-
lenge in explaining the character of “ought.” After all, there will be some
account of the character of standard-relative descriptive terms, like “tall.” If
the descriptivist is right, whatever machinery works for “tall” can also be
wheeled out for “ought.”
11.1.4 Expressivism
The expressivist rejects descriptivism. She claims that there is a deep
difference between how we should explain the meaning of descriptive
terms (like “tall”) and normative terms (like “ought”). Three motivations
are offered for this.
4 This explanation only appeals to the fact that these standards have different demands
(represented by different sets of propositions). It does not directly appeal to the fact that
one of these standards is moral while the other is legal. This may pose problems for this
specific descriptivist explanation.
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The first concerns representation. If (7) and (8) are representational, they
commit us to objects instantiating properties like being tall. If (1) to (6) are
representational, they commit us to objects instantiating properties like
being what one ought to do. Unlike being tall, such properties do not seem
to be part of the familiar physical world, so many worry that they would be
strange or mysterious.
The second concerns disagreement. If speakers systematically differ in
their criteria for applying descriptive terms like “tall,” they don’t disagree
when they assert (7) and (8): they merely talk past each other. Not so if
Antigone and Creon systematically differ in their criteria for applying the
words “morally ought.” If Antigone is a divine command theorist and Creon
is a virtue ethicist, they still disagree about what she morally ought to do.5
The third concerns “internalism.” Roughly, this is the view that there is
an internal connection between our sincere uses of “ought”—in thought
and talk—and our conative attitudes.6 If a completely dispassionate and
indifferent person said “Creon is tall,” we would have no grounds to doubt
her sincerity, but not so if she said “Antigone ought to bury Polynices.”
Absent some indication of her conative attitudes—that she is for Antigone
burying Polynices—she would seem to be parroting others’ normative
claims. This suggests that conative attitudes play importantly different
roles in normative and descriptive claims.
Enter the expressivist. She proposes that we “explain themeaning of a term”
by “what states of mind the term can be used to express” in sincere speech
acts.7 Further, she takes descriptive terms like “tall” to express cognitive states,
and normative terms like “ought” to express conative states (like plans).
The expressivist aims to vindicate anti-realism. She is “primarily motiv-
ated” by the thought that by explaining the meaning of normative but not
descriptive terms via conative states we can avoid “unwanted ontological
commitments.”8 Desires and beliefs, after all, don’t carry the same onto-
logical commitments.9
5 See especially Horgan and Timmons (1991).
6 What “internal” connection? This is a vexed question. See Smith (1994) and Ridge
(2014). It is arguable whether it is normative judgments or utterances that bear an internal
connection to motivation, hence the phrase “thought and talk.” I focus on utterances for
simplicity.
7 Gibbard (2003), p. 7; see also Ridge (2014), p. 5. AsBar-On and Sias (2013) note,many
take this pattern of explanation “to be more-or-less definitional of expressivism” (p. 702).
8 Bar-On and Sias (2013), p. 701. See Gibbard (2012), pp. 236–40; Ridge (2014), p. 101.
Expressivists about certain non-normative terms and claims typically share this motivation.
9 Beyond this intuitive gloss, I will not attempt to solve the difficult problem of how
we should distinguish realism from anti- (and quasi-)realism. For discussion, see Dreier
(2004).
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The expressivist also aims to explain disagreement in terms of inconsist-
ent conative attitudes. Antigone and Creon disagree because they express
rationally discordant attitudes. The details of the explanation differ, but the
form is like the following. Antigone expresses a plan to bury Polynices and
Creon expresses a plan for Antigone not to bury Polynices. Since these plans
are rationally discordant—a speaker who possessed both would be practic-
ally irrational—they are inconsistent, and so are the sentences that express
them.10 Attitudinal inconsistency can persist in the face of systematic
differences in speakers’ criteria for applying words like “morally ought.”
So expressivists claim to explain why virtue ethicists and divine command
theorists disagree.
Finally, the expressivist aims to explain internalism. The internal connec-
tion between sincere uses of normative terms and conative attitudes is
explained by taking those terms to express speakers’ conative attitudes.
For each of these motivations, the descriptivist has (at least) one
response.11 With one exception (see §11.6), I put these to one side. The
aim of this chapter is not to defend descriptivism, but to explore a novel
challenge to expressivism.
11.1.5 Varieties of Normativity
Expressivism is typically advanced as a theory about the meaning of nor-
mative language: the expressivist offers an explanation of the meaning of
claims about what we “ought to do,” or what we “morally ought to do.” But
this ignores the varieties of normativity. Antigone’s and Creon’s claims
about what they “ought to do” are relativized to moral, legal, prudential,
and rational standards.
In (1) to (6) “ought” is explicitly relativized to these standards. Speakers
also implicitly relativize “ought,” and other deontic modals, to standards
that are made salient by the conversational context: “You must reply in the
third person to an invitation issued in the third person” and “You can’t
double dribble!” implicitly relativize deontic modals to standards set by
etiquette and basketball. These cases also illustrate the large, even “open-
ended,”12 scale of the varieties of normativity.
This phenomenon has been noted before. It is familiar to linguists, who
call varieties of normativity “flavors” to which deontic modals are relativized.
10 See Schroeder (2008) and Woods and Baker (2015) for excellent discussion of this
issue.
11 Considering just the first motivation, descriptivists can be error theorists, naturalists,
non-naturalists, or quietists about the ontological commitments of normative language.
12 See von Fintel and Heim (2011), p. 36.
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And it is familiar to philosophers. Michael Zimmerman (1996) wrote that
“ought” is often used to “express moral obligation,” as well as “to express
what is required not by morality but by prudence, or law, or aesthetics, or
the rules of chess, or whatever.” Likewise, Stephen Finlay (2014) says “the
orthodox view” is that “the moral sense of ‘ought’ is only one of many,
including prudential and instrumental senses, and those of institutions like
legal systems, etiquette, and games.”
Historically, this phenomenon has been largely ignored by the expressiv-
ist. She focused on one (or at most, a narrow subset) of the “senses” of
“ought,”13 and offered a theory that explains its content. She offered no
account of the character of “ought.” This assessment is not unorthodox.
While Jamie Dreier (2009) writes that expressivists “decline to say what”
normative terms or claims mean by speaking of their “content, or character,”
we “can think of” expressivism as taking (sets of) conative states to be
“normative contents”; i.e. we can think of (sets of) attitudes as the semantic
“contents of sentences.”14 Dreier even contrasts expressivism with relativism,
which assigns normative claims “a Kaplanian character,” or “a function from
contexts to contents.” Similarly, Mark Schroeder’s (2008) book-length evalu-
ation of expressivism noted that the view is yet to introduce “context-sensitive
elements” to yield “a picture of the role of context . . . in which individual
terms have Kaplanian characters.”15
11.2 EXPRESSIVISM SANS CHARACTER
So far, we’ve seen that there is a linguistic phenomenon of standard-
relativity, which occurs with descriptive and normative terms alike. One
way to explain the meaning of a standard-relative term is to provide an
account of its character, which determines its contents. The descriptivist can
use the same machinery in explaining the characters of descriptive and
normative terms. The expressivist, by contrast, has not provided an account
of the characters of “ought” et al.
These observations do not amount to a challenge to the expressivist.
We have not yet seen why she needs to provide an account of the character
of “ought.” To do so, let’s continue pressing the analogy between “ought”
13 Sticking to our central case, the two most prominent expressivists—Blackburn
(1984, 1993, 1999) and Gibbard (1990, 2003)—defend expressivism primarily about
the moral or practical “ought,” and ignore the legal “ought.” Kevin Toh (2005) does
the opposite.
14 Dreier (2009), pp. 83, 85 (emphasis his). Why the “sets of” qualification? See §11.3.
15 Schroeder (2008), pp. 179–80.
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and “tall.” Does a first-order semantic theory need an account of the
character of “tall”?
Say the meaning of any use of “tall” is its semantic content. The contents
of uses of “tall” vary depending on the standards to which “tall” is relativ-
ized: “tall” (for a Theban) has a different content to “tall” (for a Greek). So
different uses of “tall” will differ in meaning: “tall” will be lexically
ambiguous.
A semantic theory with this structure would encounter two serious,
interrelated problems. First, it would lack the theoretical virtues of parsi-
mony and explanatory power. It would posit a vast number of distinct
meanings of “tall.” And it would owe us an explanation of what these
different contents have in common, if they are not systematically deter-
mined by any character.
Second, it would fail to explain the linguistic data. Predictions of lexical
ambiguity are testable, and this one fails the relevant tests. Consider the
Conjunction Reduction Test, wherein two sentences that contain a pur-
portedly ambiguous term are conjoined, using the term once in contexts
where both meanings are encouraged. To illustrate: “Pale colors are light”;
“Feathers are light”; “Pale colors and feathers are light.” The third sentence
fails the test because “light” seems zeugmatic: it has been used with two parts
of the sentence (“colors,” “feathers”) and must be understood differently in
relation to each. This is evidence for thinking that “light” is lexically
ambiguous.16 By contrast, consider (8): “Creon is tall for a Theban and
for a Greek.” If “tall” were lexically ambiguous, this should seem zeugmatic.
But it doesn’t. Such linguistic data are not explained by a theory that takes
“tall” to be ambiguous.
Would a first-order semantic theory that provides no account of the
character of “ought” face these same problems? Absolutely.17 Say themeaning
of any use of “ought” is its semantic content. The contents of different uses of
“ought” vary depending on the standards to which “ought” is relativized. So
different uses of “ought” will also differ in meaning: “ought” will be lexically
ambiguous.
16 Sennet (2011). Linguistic evidence from this test—as well as the “and so” and
“binding” tests used below in the example of Zoe—is rarely decisive. It can be hard to
distinguish between ambiguity and nearby phenomena, like semantic indeterminacy.
Further issues are posed when speakers produce zeugma for poetic effect: in “She took
her hat, and her leave,” “took” is used literally in relation to “her hat” and figuratively in
relation to “her leave.”
17 Importantly, this poses problems for expressivists and certain descriptivists who
cavalierly posit multiple senses of “ought” without providing any account of the character
of “ought.”
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If the expressivist does not provide an account of the character of “ought,”
her theory faces two serious, interrelated problems. First, it would lack the
virtues of parsimony and explanatory power. It would posit widespread
lexical ambiguity, perhaps even attributing to “ought” an open-ended set
of meanings (to correspond to the open-ended set of varieties of normativ-
ity). This violates the maxim that we should not multiply meanings beyond
necessity. Moreover, with no account of the character that determines these
varying contents, it would not explain what these different contents have
in common.18
Second, the expressivist will not explain the linguistic data. When we
have convergent standards, we can take sentences in which “ought” is
relativized to different standards (“Morally, Antigone ought not bury
Polynices” and “Legally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices”) and conjoin
them using “ought” once (as in (2)). If “ought” were lexically ambiguous,
such sentences would seem zeugmatic, as “light” does in “Pale blue and
feathers are light.” That “ought” does not seem zeugmatic in cases like (2)
and (4) strongly suggests that it is not ambiguous. This is a straightforward
application of the Conjunction Reduction Test.
We get the same results if we apply other standard tests for lexical
ambiguity to “ought,” and other deontic modals that are relativized to
different standards. Consider the following case. Zoe has three kids: Joe,
Kim, and Leo. Joe is in the Evil Villains Club, where it is a rule that
members are silent when someone is presenting a scheme, as is happening
now. Kim is in a legally designated noise-reduction zone. Leo is near a
dangerous predator; if he makes a peep, it’ll kill him and some kids. Now we
can consider sentences like “Joe must be quiet, and so too for Kim and Leo,”
or “All of Zoe’s kids must be quiet.” In these sentences, “must” is implicitly
relativized to different standards. But it does not strike us as zeugmatic,
which strongly suggests that it is not ambiguous.19
Perhaps these arguments are not decisive. But they at least show that the
onus is on the expressivist to show that her explanation of the meaning(s)
(contents) of “ought” is plausible in the absence of an account of its
character. It is difficult to see how the expressivist could discharge this
explanatory debt; a disunified semantics is certainly not favored by the data.
18 For more on what explanatory power is needed, see Swanson (2007), p. 1195 and
Finlay (2014), pp. 55 ff. The expressivist has offered no attempt to discharge this
explanatory debt. It is also worth noting that known attempts to do so—such as
Ludlow’s (2008)—would undercut the disagreement-based motivation for expressivism.
See Plunkett and Sundell (2013).
19 See Zwicky and Sadock (1975) and Stanley (2005) for discussion.
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Now we have a challenge for expressivists. To meet this challenge, an
expressivist must give us an account of (a) the character of “ought,” and (b)
what modifiers (“morally,” “legally”) add to the meaning of sentences like
“Antigone ought to bury Polynices.” Expressivists’ answers are subject to
three constraints: they must be generalizable to the open-ended set of
varieties of normativity; they must explain the univocality of “ought”; and
they must explain inconsistency. As we shall see, it is difficult to satisfy all of
these constraints at the same time.
11.3 SEMANTIC EXPRESSIVISM
All forms of expressivism face this challenge. There are two main ways for
the expressivists to meet it: at the semantic level, or at themeta-semantic level.
Let’s start with semantic expressivists, who answer the first-order question
“What does ‘ought’ mean?” They take “ought” to mean the attitude it
expresses when uttered sincerely.20 This is a rival to the descriptivist view of
character from §11.1.3.
So how can the semantic expressivist explain the character of “ought”? I’ll
first argue for a minimal condition that any such explanation must satisfy:
Unified Expressivism “Ought” always expresses conative attitude X.
Why is this is a minimum condition? First, consider what an expressivist
view would look like without it. Say “ought” expresses a plan in “Morally,
Antigone ought not bury Polynices” and a belief in “Legally, Antigone ought
not bury Polynices.” If “ought” expresses two different types of mental states
and its meaning is identical to the state expressed, it is ambiguous. This is the
result that the expressivist must avoid. So when it is relativized to different
standards, “ought” must express the same attitude type.
Second, consider how this minimum condition can do explanatory work.
The character of “ought” can be played by this attitude type, and the contents
of “ought” can be played by tokens of this type. Take a simple example of
conjunction reduction: “Antigone ought not bury Polynices, or deceive
Creon.” We can take “ought” to express one type of attitude—such as being
for—which systematically determines the contents of the conjuncts: being
for Antigone not burying Polynices and being for Antigone not deceiving
Creon. And we can offer this same in cases involving standard-relativity, like
(2): “Morally and legally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices.” If “ought”
20 This is roughly Rosen’s (1998) characterization of expressivism: it offers “a mapping
from statements . . . to the mental states they ‘express’ when uttered sincerely,” p. 387.
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expresses and means one type of mental state (character), this type can
systematically determine the different attitude tokens (contents) expressed
by the conjoined claims “Morally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices” and
“Legally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices.” This is a plausible explanation
for why “ought” is not zeugmatic in (2).
But it is not a full explanation of the character of “ought,” because it does
not explain varieties of normativity. How does this type of mental state
interact with the standards to which “ought” is relativized to produce token
mental states? What do “morally” and “legally” add to the meaning of (2)?
There are two promising places to look for an answer. The semantic
expressivist could claim that varieties of normativity modify the objects of
this type of attitude, or modify other features of the attitude itself. Let’s take
these in turn.
11.3.1 Objects of Hyperplans
The most promising version of the first strategy builds on work by Allan
Gibbard. Gibbard (2003) appeals to the notion of a hyperplan, a plan which
covers any occasion for choice one might conceivably be in, and for each alternative
open on such an occasion, to adopt the plan involves either rejecting the alternative
or rejecting it. In other words, the plan either forbids an alternative or permits it.21
Themeaning of normative terms is explained via the expression of hyperplans.22
There are three reasons why Gibbardian expressivism is a particularly
promising place to look to develop an expressivist explanation of the
character of “ought.” First, hyperplans have structural features that are
similar to the possible worlds employed in the truth-conditional semantics
we considered in §11.1.3. As Yalcin writes, hyperplans can be “formally
analogous” to functions.23
Second, Yalcin has argued that this framework can explain a related linguis-
tic phenomenon—the relativization of “ought” to bodies of information—
without requiring an additional “distinct lexical entry for ‘ought’.”24
21 Gibbard (2003), p. 56. A different Gibbardian strategy that I don’t consider (since
I don’t know how to develop it) would appeal to simulating conative states. See Gibbard
(2015).
22 More accurately, since “real people are undecided about what to do in most possible
situations (just as we are undecided about most details of what is the case, which world is
ours), our planning states can be represented by sets of hyperplans,”Dreier (2009), p. 84.
23 Yalcin (2012), p. 148.
24 Yalcin (2012), p. 154. The relativization of words like “ought” to standards and to
bodies of information are often classed together under the umbrella “context-sensitivity.”
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Yalcin does not consider how the framework can explain standard-
relativity. But Gibbard discusses how “ought” claims that are relative to
moral and rational standards could express and mean the same type of
mental state. This is the final reason why Gibbardian expressivism is a
particularly promising place to start.
Gibbard (1990) proposed that rational and moral “ought” claims express
the same type of mental state with different objects.25 “Rationally, A ought to
φ” expresses the speaker’s hyperplan for A to φ.26 (Put technically: the
object of the attitude is the prejacent.) “Morally, A ought to φ” expresses the
speaker’s hyperplan to blame A if A does not φ. This only addresses two
members of the open-ended set of varieties of normativity, but the strategy
could be generalized by identifying other act-types which form the objects of
conditional hyperplans. For example, “Legally, A ought to φ” might express
the speaker’s hyperplan for A to be punished if A does not φ.27 Similar
moves could be made when “ought” is relativized to prudence, etiquette, the
rules of games, and so on.
While it is initially promising, this strategy generates the wrong results
about inconsistency. It makes claims about what we morally ought to do
inconsistent with claims about what we legally, prudentially, or rationally
ought to do.
Consider how this view explains the inconsistency of (1) and (2): “Mor-
ally, Antigone ought not bury Polynices” and “Morally, Antigone ought to
bury Polynices” express hyperplans for Antigone to be blamed if she does
bury Polynices and for Antigone to be blamed if she does not bury Polynices.
These plans are discordant, so the sentences are inconsistent: Creon and
Antigone disagree.
But what about (1) itself? “Morally, Antigone ought to bury Polynices,
but legally she ought not do so” expresses hyperplans for Antigone to be
blamed if she does bury Polynices and for Antigone to be punished if she
does not bury Polynices. On many respectable views, being punished
25 Like Wedgwood (2010) (p. 121), I take it that these objects can be actions or
attitudes. I take it that similar objections arise either way, but I focus on actions in the
discussion below. I also ignore the aforementioned qualification about sets of hyperplans;
nothing hangs on this.
26 For the sake of explanatory convenience, I am eliding over several exegetical issues.
First, as already mentioned, speakers express sets of hyperplans. Second, hyperplans are
not employed until Gibbard (2003). Third, unlike Gibbard (1990), Gibbard’s (2003)
view is about the technical term “the thing to do,” rather the rational “ought”: i.e. “φ-ing
is the thing to do” expresses the speaker’s hyperplan to φ. None of this affects the
objections that follow.
27 A broadly similar view about “A is legally obligated to φ” was suggested by Hart
(1982).
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constitutively involves being blamed.28 If this is so, these hyperplans are
discordant,29 the conjuncts are inconsistent, and Antigone disagrees with
herself. She is irrational.
This is an implausible result. How can the expressivist respond?
She could bite the bullet. Perhaps “Legally Antigone ought to bury
Polynices” entails that “Morally, Antigone ought to bury Polynices,” so
the conjuncts of (1) are inconsistent. This response tethers expressivism to a
controversial form of legal anti-positivism.30 Moreover, (1) and (2) are just
one example of a general phenomenon. We can substitute legality for other
standards, like etiquette; the same issue arises, and this anti-positivist
response becomes increasingly implausible.31
She could claim that it is consistent and rationally compatible for Antig-
one to express hyperplans to be blamed for burying and for not burying
Polynices. There’s nothing irrational about planning to be blamed, whatever
one does. Perhaps this is plausible. But if so, the expressivist loses her
explanation for why (1) and (2) are inconsistent, and why Antigone and
Creon disagree. Moreover, we can construct variants of the case where this
move is unavailable.32
The expressivist could appeal to more specific objects of our attitudes that
are constitutively independent. For this to generalize, the expressivist must
identify a highly specific distinct object of our hyperplans for each variety of
28 Feinberg (1970).
29 That may be too quick. Perhaps “legally ought” expresses (passive) plans for
someone to be punished (and blamed), which are not discordant with (active) plans to
blame someone that are expressed by “morally ought.” (See Harman (1973) on passive
“ought to be” and active “ought to” claims.) But this should not detain us. I take it that
“legally ought” would express plans to be blamed by the state, and so by the relevant legal
officials. So any appeal to a passive–active distinction would not help in analogous cases
where the speaker is Creon.
30 Of the kind defended by Greenberg (2014). Dworkin (1986) accepts no such
entailment.
31 To illustrate, consider “According to etiquette, A ought to φ.” The expressivist
could take it to express the speaker’s conditional plan to socially distance herself from A if
A does not φ. But on Scanlon’s (2008) view, blame constitutively involves social
distancing. This will suffice to generate inconsistencies between “ought” claims that are
relative to morality and etiquette. Biting the bullet by accepting anti-positivism about
etiquette is deeply counterintuitive.
32 Depending on one’s stance on moral dilemmas, “I morally ought to φ and to not φ”
may be consistent. But this should not detain us. We can make the same objection with
“I am notmorally obligated to φ, but I am morally obligated to φ,” and “I am notmorally
obligated to φ, but I am legally obligated to φ.” The former sentence is definitely
inconsistent, so for Gibbardian expressivists it must express a practically irrational pair
of attitudes towards my being blamed if I don’t φ. But if punishment constitutively
involves blame, then the latter sentence also expresses a practically irrational pair of
attitudes towards that same object.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/5/2017, SPi
278 Daniel Wodak
normativity. That is a daunting task. Especially since we must have, share,
and conventionally express attitudes with these highly specific objects. It is
already doubtful that the pacifists at my yoga studio regularly plan to blame
and punish when they make sincere claims about what we morally and
legally ought to do. Appealing to attitudes with highly specific objects
amplifies this concern considerably.
Moreover, no matter which distinct objects of our attitudes the expressiv-
ist appeals to, she is guaranteed to get the wrong results about inconsistency.
To see why, recall (5): Creon’s claim that “Morally, Antigone ought not
bury Polynices; but if she buries Polynices, I rationally ought not blame
her.” This is obviously consistent. Does the Gibbardian view get this result?
The first conjunct expresses Creon’s hyperplan to blame Antigone if Antig-
one buries Polynices. The second conjunct expresses Creon’s hyperplan not
to blame Antigone if she buries Polynices. (Recall: the object of the hyper-
plans expressed by rational “ought” claims is the prejacent.) So Creon
expresses rationally incompatible attitudes.
Can the expressivist tinker with the details of her view to avoid this result?
I have no proof that she can’t, but I’m skeptical. The Gibbardian strategy is
to explain the character of “ought” in terms of the expression of the same
type of attitude, and explain the varieties of normativity as altering the
objects of that attitude. But the above paragraph illustrates how the object of
the expressed attitude will depend on the variety of normativity and the
prejacent: in other words, what token attitude “A ought to φ” expresses
depends on the modifier (e.g. “rationally”) and the values of A and φ. These
can vary independently. So in the infinite possible combinations of varieties
of normativity and prejacents, what rules out the possibility of cases where
“A ought to φ” and “B ought to ψ” are relativized to different standards yet
express rationally discordant attitudes?
11.3.2 Flavors of Approval
What if the expressivist gives up on this appeal to hyperplans and their
objects, claiming that “ought” expresses a different type of conative attitude?
She may appeal to approval instead. Unlike hyperplans, approval cannot
play a similar role to possible worlds in truth-conditional semantics. But
there are at least two reasons why the expressivist might make this move.
First, it might seem that the Gibbardian’s woes can be traced back to her
claim that “ought” expresses an “all-in” attitude: hyperplans. Approval, by
contrast, is a “pro tanto” attitude. If I plan to drink and not drink my coffee,
I’m irrational. If I express those plans, what I express is inconsistent. But
I can approve of both drinking and not drinking my coffee without being
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/5/2017, SPi
Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity 279
irrational, and express that approval without inconsistency. This might help
the expressivist avoid over-generating inconsistency. Say that by asserting
(1)—“Morally, I ought to bury Polynices, but legally, I ought not do so”—
Antigone expresses her approval of both burying and not burying Polynices.
Those attitudes, and the sentences that express them, are consistent.
Before we issue a hurrah for approval, we should notice that this form of
expressivism under-generates inconsistency. Consider the disagreement
between Antigone and Creon. When he says (2)—“No, morally and legally,
you ought to bury Polynices”—he expresses his approval of not burying
Polynices. That attitude is consistent with what Antigone expresses. Now
the expressivist has lost one of the central motivations for her view: that it
explains moral disagreement.
Second, and more compellingly, it might seem that approval is a type of
mental state that comes in different “flavors” that match and can explain the
varieties of normativity. Perhaps there is moral approval and legal approval
and rational approval and so on. This is a different strategy for the semantic
expressivist. Since it takes “ought” to express the same type of attitude, it is
also unified in the sense specified above. And since she takes varieties of
normativity to modify the “flavor” of that attitude, the expressivist provides
a different explanation of the character of “ought” and how it is relativized to
standards.
The trick is to explain what this talk of “flavors” of approval amounts to.
Björnsson and McPherson (2014) provide an illuminating way to cash this
out. To distinguish the “non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judge-
ments of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic
disapproval,” they appeal to the distinct grounds of states of approval.33 This
is fairly intuitive. If I witnessed Peter Singer gracefully scoop a drowning
child out of a pond, I would morally and aesthetically approve of his act:
I would express the same type of attitude (approval), with the same object
(Singer’s action). The token attitudes are still distinct, however, as they are
based on different features of the object: I would morally approve because
Singer’s act averted harm, and I would aesthetically approve because of the
elegant arc of the motion itself. So the same type of attitude, approval, may
33 Björnsson and McPherson (2014), p. 1. Actually, “grounds” are only one of the five
features of moral claims that Björnsson and McPherson appeal to (pp. 14–16), but the
other four offer no additional resources here. As they acknowledge, three of these
features—aversion, personal-level acceptance, and engagement—“are shared with
instances of many other types” of claims. That is also true of the remaining feature: social
hostility. When Creon claims that “Antigone ought not φ,” he may well be disposed to be
socially hostile to Antigone if she φs regardless of whether “ought” is relativized to
morality or legality. (Indeed, he must be in cases where these standards converge.)
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come in different “flavors,” and tokens of this type with the same objects
may be distinguished by their grounds.
This forms the basis for a second promising expressivist strategy. “A ought
to φ” always expresses approval towards A φing; when “ought” is relativized
to standards (“morally,” “legally,” . . . ), that expresses the distinct “flavors”
(read: grounds) of the token state of approval. To pursue this strategy, the
expressivist needs to identify these distinct grounds. On Björnsson and
McPherson’s view, “Morally, A ought to φ” expresses the speaker’s approval
of A φing, where her approval is (paradigmatically) based on the perception
that for A not to φ would involve A “intentionally harming or risking harm
to others” and/or A failing “to respect certain boundaries that play a central
role in sustaining social cooperation.”34 All we need, it seems, is the distinct
(paradigmatic) grounds for other varieties of normativity: legality, prudence,
rationality, and so forth.
One quick and promising way to develop and generalize this strategy
would be to borrow a formal feature from the descriptivist’s account of the
character of “ought” (from §11.1.3). The descriptivist appeals to an order-
ing source, g, that represents the demands of the relevant standard. The
expressivist can take that same set of propositions to be the grounds for the
relevant states of approval. So g allows for standard-relativity on a descrip-
tivist or expressivist view.35
However, no matter how this strategy is developed, it encounters the
same problems with inconsistency that afflicted its predecessor. To see why,
let’s ask: Does having two tokens of the same type of attitude with incon-
sistent contents cease to be rationally discordant when those attitudes have
different grounds?
Let’s say that it does. This is the best case for the expressivist. Initially, she
now seems able to deliver the right results about inconsistency. Consider (1)
and (2). Antigone says “Morally, I ought to bury Polynices,” expressing
approval of burying Polynices, and Creon claims “Morally, Antigone ought
not bury Polynices,” expressing approval of her not burying Polynices. Let’s
say that these attitudes have the same ground (e.g. harm), and so are
inconsistent. We have an explanation of interpersonal disagreement. Now
consider the other conjunct of (1): “Legally, I ought not bury Polynices.”
This expresses Antigone’s approval of not burying Polynices. But since it has
a different ground (e.g. respect for the law of the land), this does not
generate intrapersonal disagreement.
34 Björnsson and McPherson (2014), p. 15.
35 I’m grateful to Alex Kaiserman and Hrafn Asgeirsson for suggesting this idea.
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So far, so good. But this view encounters several problems. For one, it is
consistent with Björnsson and McPherson’s view that Antigone could
express moral approval of burying Polynices based on one ground (harm)
and Creon could express moral approval of her not burying Polynices based
on a different ground (social cooperation). But this would under-generate
inconsistency.
For another, it is consistent with Björnsson and McPherson’s view that
Antigone could express moral approval of burying Polynices based on one
ground (social cooperation) and legal disapproval of not burying Polynices
based on that same ground. If it is plausible that claims about what we
morally and legally ought to do both express approval, it is also plausible that
they both sometimes express approval grounded in the perception that acts
involve “a failure to respect certain boundaries that play a central role in
sustaining social cooperation.” But then the two conjuncts of (1) express
moral approval of burying Polynices and legal approval of not burying
Polynices based on the same ground. If the grounds of moral and legal
approval can overlap, this will over-generate inconsistency. This problem is
amplified if the expressivist develops this strategy by taking g to individuate
standards, as it is quite obvious that different modal flavors (morality,
legality) can share many of the same demands.
The expressivist could attempt to solve both of these problems by
positing that there is a unique, non-disjunctive ground for all tokens of
moral approval (e.g. harm), and making a similar move for every other
variety of normativity. But that would be a counterintuitive commitment. It
is already doubtful that Antigone (our divine command theorist) and Creon
(our virtue ethicist) express moral approval grounded in the perception that
acts are harmful or fail to respect boundaries that play a role in social
cooperation. Making the distinct ground of moral approval even more
specific will be far too discriminatory.36
Moreover, even this fix would not help when we consider cases involving
embedding. Take (6), Creon’s claim that “Legally, I ought to punish
Antigone. But morally, I should not have made it the case that legally
I ought to punish her.” Ex hypothesi, this speech act expresses Creon’s
disapproval of his own approval of punishing Antigone.37 Given their
36 The expressivist, like Björnsson and McPherson (2014), might take distinct
grounds to only be features of paradigmatic moral claims. But this is no help. Now we
need to know how to discriminate between non-paradigmatic moral claims and paradig-
matic non-moral claims. An anonymous referee suggests that the expressivist may be able
to ameliorate these concerns by appealing to the phenomenon of semantic blindness. (See
Hawthorne (2004).) I don’t think that this response succeeds, but cannot show why here.
37 Or rather, disapproval of having made it the case that he approves of punishing. I’m
not sure if this injects enough space between the higher- and lower-order attitudes to
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commitments elsewhere, expressivists are hard-pressed to deny that these
first-order and higher-order attitudes are rationally discordant, regardless of
any difference in their grounds.
What if having two tokens of the same type of attitude with inconsistent
contents does not cease to be rationally discordant when those attitudes are
based on different grounds? This seems more plausible. If I plan to drink my
coffee because it is delicious and plan not to drink my coffee because I am
over-caffeinated, these plans are inconsistent and render me irrational. But if
the expressivist accepts this, the second strategy is a non-starter. Identifying
distinct grounds for our attitudes will not generate the more fine-grained
inconsistency conditions that the expressivist needs: she will still lack any
explanation for why moral “ought” claims can be inconsistent with each
other, but not with legal “ought” claims; so she will still lack an explanation
for why Antigone and Creon disagree, but Antigone does not disagree with
herself.
11.4 META-SEMANTIC EXPRESSIVISM
So far we’ve seen that the expressivist owes us an explanation of the character
of “ought” across all varieties of normativity, and that an expressivist
semantics struggles to deliver that while also explaining why inconsistency
is standard-relative. Once the expressivist must posit that “ought” always
expresses the same type of mental state (to explain its character), any way of
explaining the relativization of “ought” to standards allows for inconsistency
between moral, rational, legal, and prudential “ought” claims. Equally
implausibly, it requires us to posit that speakers like Antigone and Creon
are practically irrational.
This gives us due cause to be skeptical that the expressivist should pursue a
semantic program that rivals well-developed truth-conditional accounts of the
character of “ought.” Instead, she could pursue a meta-semantic program.
Meta-semantic theories answer the second-order question: “In virtue of
what does the phonetic and orthographic sequence ‘ought’ mean what it
does?” Michael Ridge (2014) offers the most well-developed form of meta-
semantic expressivism, and his view seems particularly promising in this
context. Ridge explicitly accepts that “the key terms with which normative
claims are made (‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘reason’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, and cognates) are
avoid discordance. We could remove that space if we switched from “A ought to φ” to “It
ought to be that p” (as in: “Morally, it ought not be the case that I legally ought to φ”).
But this would introduce other complications regarding how we should treat “ought to
be” constructions.
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context-sensitive,” just like “tall”; but they are “not brutely ambiguous.”
Rather, they “have a unified meaning,” insofar as they have a single Kaplan-
ian character.38
Ridge adopts a truth-conditional account of the character of “ought” (like
Kratzer’s from §11.1.3): the character of “ought” is a function from contexts
to contents,39 which we can call “Z.” Ridge argues that meta-semantic
expressivism is consistent with this first-order semantic theory. Let’s grant
this, and focus on answering the meta-semantic question: “in virtue of
what does the orthographic and phonetic sequence ‘ought’ mean Z”? The
expressivist answer is that “ought” means Z in virtue of expressing some
conative state.
11.4.1 A Disunified Meta-semantics
Perhaps surprisingly, Ridge thinks that this answer is only true in some cases.
He explicitly adopts a disunified meta-semantics: “Expressivism provides the
right meta-semantic theory for only certain uses” of terms like “ought.”40 Some
uses of “ought” (e.g. “the ‘ought’ ofmorality”) meanZ in virtue of expressing a
non-representational conative attitude; other uses of “ought” (e.g. “the
‘ought’ of etiquette”) mean Z in virtue of expressing a “robustly representa-
tional belief,” a belief which carries ontological commitments.41
Two problems emerge here. First, Ridge must concede that there is a
viable non-expressivist explanation of why “ought” means Z in a wide
variety of uses. This explanation is non-expressivist insofar as it appeals to
robustly representational beliefs. And it is viable in that it explains: why
“ought” means Z; how context selects the relevant ordering source; how
competent speakers use “ought” to communicate, coordinate, and collect
information; and how speakers disagree even in the face of systematic differ-
ences in their criteria for applying words (like “legally ought”).42 Once that
viable non-expressivist explanation is on the table for some uses, why not offer
it across the board? A unified meta-semantics is preferable, if only for the sake
of parsimony.
Second, consider how this non-expressivist explanation interacts with
its expressivist counterpart. Here Ridge is committed to an unexplained
38 Ridge (2014), p. 9.
39 This is not to say that there are no important differences in the precise details of
their semantics for modals. For example, Ridge argues that his view better addresses
concerns about inconsistent sets of requirements. These details are simply orthogonal to
our concerns.
40 Ridge (2014), p. 9 (emphasis added). 41 Ridge (2014), pp. 40, 93.
42 Dworkin (1986) famously called this “theoretical disagreement” about the law.
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coincidence. There is one explanandum: that the word “ought” means Z.
There are two radically different explanantia;43 the expressivist, after all, is
emphatic about the differences between representational beliefs and non-
representational conative states. If the explanantia are radically different,
why is the explanandum exactly the same? Why don’t the radical differences
between the states that we are expressing translate to differences in meaning?
And relatedly, why would we employ one word to express such radically
different mental states?
This combination of a unified semantics and disunified meta-semantics
seems quite implausible. Importantly, there are no companions in guilt to
whom Ridge can appeal. We take “tall” to have a single meaning, even
though it can be relativized to different standards. Once we agree upon that,
surely we should hope for a unified meta-semantics for “tall,” rather than
different meta-semantic explanations for why different uses of “tall” have the
same meaning? It may be reasonable to offer different meta-semantic
explanations for different fragments of language, such as proper names
and logical connectives, but it is unprecedented to offer different meta-
semantic explanations for a fragment of language for which we have a
unified semantics: deontic modals.
11.4.2 A Unified Meta-semantics
Meta-semantic expressivists might wish to part company from Ridge and
offer a unified explanation for why “ought” means Z. All uses of “ought”
mean Z because they express non-representational conative attitudes. More
is required for this to be a unified explanation. (Would we have a unified
explanation if some uses of “ought” mean Z because they express approval
and others mean Z because they express hyperplans?) We need “ought” to
mean what it does in claims like (1)–(4) because it expresses the same type of
non-cognitive state.
43 In personal communication, Ridge notes that the quoted passage from p. 9 “must
be handled with great care,” as he had “in mind the meta-semantic story one tells about
the semantic contents (not characters) of sentence tokens (not types).” Ridge contends that
his meta-semantic explanation of why “ought” means Z is unified: “Linguistic
conventions . . . dictate that a speaker who asserts ‘A ought to φ in context C’ in a context
of utterance U has made the judgment” that is fixed in a certain way, where “the
judgment” is simply a variable. “In some contexts, the relevant judgment will simply be
an ordinary garden-variety representational belief,” while “in other contexts, the relevant
judgment will be” non-cognitive. I take it that this explanation is only superficially
unified: when we replace “the judgment” with a disjunction of radically dissimilar
disjuncts (“cognitive or non-cognitive attitudes”), it is a disunified meta-semantic explanation
of why “ought”means function Z.
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This is the same constraint that we reached when we considered whether
the semantic expressivist could provide an explanation of the character of
“ought.” Once that constraint was in place, we saw that the expressivist
encountered serious problems with getting the right results about inconsist-
ency. She either failed to generate inconsistency between claims about what
we morally ought to do, or over-generated inconsistencies between claims
about what we morally, legally, prudentially, and rationally ought to do.
Now the meta-semantic expressivist will face the same problems. She will
either predict that speakers like Antigone and Creon fail to disagree with
each other, or predict that they disagree with themselves. Neither option is
palatable.
11.5 THE EXPRESSIVIST ’S DILEMMA
So far the challenge to expressivism has been framed in terms of relatively
highfalutin distinctions (content and character, semantics and meta-
semantics). We can now abstract away from such details and reframe the
challenge.
First, let’s make two simple and plausible observations about “ought” et al.:
Inconsistency “A ought to φ” and “A ought not φ” are always and only
inconsistent when “ought” is relative to the same standard.44
UnivocalityDeontic modals are not lexically ambiguous when relativized.
INCONSISTENCY is a plausible general truth about standard-relative modals. It
explains why the conjuncts of (1)—“Morally, I ought to bury Polynices, but
legally I ought not do so”—are consistent. It also explains why Antigone
disagrees with Creon when she says (1) and he says (2): “No, morally and
legally, you ought not bury Polynices.” UNIVOCALITY is supported by lin-
guistic data and considerations of parsimony and explanatory power
(§11.2). My conjecture is that no form of expressivism plausibly explains
both observations.
Why? The answer does not depend on how the expressivist (a) identifies
the conative state that deontic modals express (plans, approval, etc.), or (b)
specifies what it is to understand the meaning of those modals in terms of
44 This is a simple, imprecise formulation of the observation. It should be broader: “A
ought to φ” and “A ought not ψ” are consistent when “ought” is relative to different
standards. (See §11.3.1.) And there may be exceptions where “A ought to φ” and “A
ought not φ” are inconsistent even though they are relative to different standards, due to
some interesting relation between those standards.
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those states. It concerns whether she accepts UNIFIED EXPRESSIVISM: that
“ought” always expresses the same type of conative state.
Now we can state the dilemma. UNIFIED EXPRESSIVISM is either true or
false. If it is true, the expressivist fails to explain INCONSISTENCY. If it is false,
the expressivist fails to explain UNIVOCALITY. So the expressivist fails to
explain either INCONSISTENCY or UNIVOCALITY.
Consider the first horn. In (1)–(4), Antigone and Creon disagree about
what she morally ought to do, but agree about what she legally and
prudentially ought to do. If unified expressivism is true, “Antigone morally
ought not bury Polynices,” “Antigone morally ought to bury Polynices,”
and “Antigone legally ought not bury Polynices” all express the same type
of attitude. If the first two express inconsistent attitudes, why do the latter
two express consistent attitudes? The expressivist needs a general, systematic
explanation of this. None of the candidates we considered succeeded.
All that matters for this argument is that “ought” expresses the same type
of mental state, X, regardless of the relevant standard. The same issue arises if
we substitute X for hyperplans or approval or “being for” or whatnot. That’s
why the identification of the relevant conative state is downstream from the
choice between unified and disunified expressivism.
Now consider the second horn. The expressivist proposes that we explain
the meaning of “ought” in terms of the mental state(s) that “ought”
expresses. If so, we can offer the same explanation of the meaning of
“ought” only if “ought” expresses the same type of mental state. If different
uses of “ought” express plans and preferences, or approval and beliefs, or
what have you, then the expressivist is committed to offering different
explanations of the meaning of “ought.” I take it that this is true on any
specification of what it is to explain the meaning of “ought,” which is why
the semantic–meta-semantic distinction is also downstream. However, it is
worth noting that disunified meta-semantic views are on better footing than
disunified semantic views. Both lack similar theoretical virtues (especially
parsimony), but the latter is also in tension with linguistic data.
This way of framing the challenge reveals why some available responses
offer partial solutions at best. First, note that there are two distinct, related
issues with inconsistency: if UNIFIED EXPRESSIVISM is true and (1) and (2)
express rationally discordant attitudes then (1) does too, which is sufficient
to make the conjuncts of (1) inconsistent. So it won’t help to move to a
(semantic or meta-semantic) hybrid expressivism on which normative
terms express conative and cognitive states.45 If the expression of rationally
45 Ridge (2014) is a hybrid expressivist; I ignored this complication in §11.4 to
simplify things.
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discordant conative states is sufficient to make the conjuncts of (1) incon-
sistent, it is no help to add that (1) also expresses beliefs. And even if it
isn’t—which is a big concession—it is still a problem to predict that by
asserting (1) Antigone expresses rationally discordant attitudes.
It’s not clear whether the unified expressivist can avoid such predic-
tions. She may lean on her account of sincerity, conceding that by
asserting (1) Antigone conventionally expresses rationally discordant atti-
tudes, but arguing that Antigone need not have those attitudes; she is only
committed to having those attitudes, such that she either has those atti-
tudes or is insincere. But these predictions are no better. Antigone does not
seem practically irrational, insincere, or committed to practical irrationality
(whatever that means).
Second, note that to explain univocality it is not enough to get the result
that “ought” means the same thing in (2). It must also mean the same thing
in both uses in (1). So it won’t help to move to a view on which some legal
claims (like Creon’s) express conative states while others (like Antigone’s)
express cognitive states. That move could seem well motivated. Hart (1994)
famously distinguished “internal” and “external” legal claims: the former are
used to guide, recommend, and criticize, while the latter are not. This might
tempt some to offer an expressivist treatment of Creon’s internal legal claim
and a descriptivist treatment of Antigone’s external legal claim. But that
temptation should be resisted, as this view suggests that Antigone’s and
Creon’s claims about what she “legally ought” to do differ in meaning,
making it hard to explain why Antigone and Creon agree.
Third, note that expressivists face the same challenge with all varieties of
normativity. The same issues arise when we swap “legally” for “prudentially”
in (3) and (4). So even if the expressivist can legitimately offer a disunified
approach to “morally ought” and (external uses of) “legally ought,” she still
faces the burden of explaining why there is no inconsistency in claims like
(3): “Morally I ought to bury Polynices, but prudentially I ought not do so.”
11.6 PRAGMATIC EXPRESSIVISM
This dilemma is not an impossibility proof. It is a challenge: the onus is on
the expressivist to deliver a view that avoids being impaled on both horns.
Interestingly, there is a view that can achieve that quite easily, but it offers
expressivists a Pyrrhic victory, as it fails to vindicate any anti-realist
ambitions.
The view in question appeals to pragmatics. “Smith is punctual” literally
means that Smith is punctual, but if it is the main content of a letter of
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recommendation it communicates—in particular, it conversationally impli-
cates—that Smith is a mediocre candidate. This illustrates how speakers use
more than semantic meaning to communicate about their mental states and
circumstances.
Speakers may use normative terms to communicate information about
their conative states: “I ought to bury Polynices” might conversationally
implicate, but not mean, Antigone’s approval of burying Polynices. This
pragmatic thesis could be considered a form of expressivism; it could offer a
different specification of what it is to understand meaning in terms of the
expression of attitudes.
This pragmatic thesis is consistent with UNIVOCALITY and INCONSISTENCY.
It does not require positing lexical ambiguity or offering disunified meta-
semantic explanations, for the simple reason that pragmatics is distinct from
semantics and meta-semantics. Nor does it lead to implausible predictions
of inconsistency between sentences or discordance in speakers’ attitudes.
Conversational implicatures are flexible and cancelable,46 and preserve as far
as possible the presumption that speakers are rational. When Antigone says
“Morally I ought to bury Polynices,” this may implicate that she is for
burying Polynices; but when she says “Morally I ought to bury Polynices
but legally I ought not do so,” this need not implicate that she is irrationally
for and against burying Polynices.
This pragmatic thesis can play a role in explaining the meanings (con-
tents) of uses of “ought.” Standard-relative terms can be used to form
sentences that are syntactically complete but semantically incomplete. Con-
sider “Creon is tall.” Being tall is a relational property, and this sentence fails
to specify one relatum. It may be that conversational implicatures about
speakers’ intentions help determine the relevant comparison class—the
standard to which “tall” is relativized—to generate a logically complete
proposition. This is what King and Stanley (2005) call a “weak” pragmatic
effect: pragmatics plays a role in assigning contents to uses of standard-
relative terms. The same may hold for “Antigone ought to bury Polynices”:
it might be syntactically complete but semantically incomplete, as the
standard is unspecified.47 Conversational implicatures about speakers’ atti-
tudes can help determine the relevant standards in assigning contents to
normative terms.
46 For evidence that the so-called “internal connection” between sincere uses of
normative terms and speakers’ conative attitudes is in fact cancelable, see Woods (2014).
47 See Finlay (2014) for related discussion (in terms of unspecified ends). Notably,
there are multiple plausible ways of cashing out the idea that pragmatic implicatures about
speakers’ attitudes can have weak pragmatic effects; another was suggested by an anonym-
ous referee.
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I take it that there’s much to be said for this pragmatic thesis. But many
worry that “pragmatic expressivism” is a form of expressivism in name only.
Ridge, for instance, claims that “expressivism is most clearly not well
understood as a theory in pragmatics,” because that would not vindicate
anti-realism:
If that were all that expressivism had to add to the theory of meaning then it would
be compatible with a fully representational theory of literal meaning. The whole
point of going expressivist was to avoid the problems inherent in a representationalist
approach.48
I will not try to adjudicate whether anti-representationalism is “the whole
point” of going expressivist, or whether expressivism should be a broader
church that admits merely pragmatic parishioners. Instead, I will make three
points. First, given its role in weak pragmatic effects, this plausible prag-
matic thesis can easily be misconstrued as a distinct version of meta-
semantic expressivism. Second, such pragmatic theses are consistent with a
descriptivist semantics and meta-semantics. And third, descriptivists can and
do exploit such pragmatic theses to explain phenomena that were thought
to favor expressivism. This includes cases of disagreement where speakers
(like virtue ethicists and divine command theorists) systematically differ in
their criteria for applying words (like “morally ought”).49 And it includes the
so-called “internal” connection between conative states and sincere uses of
normative terms like “ought.”50 So such pragmatic theses may neutralize
two of the three motivations for expressivism. This makes it more difficult
for expressivists to lean on disagreement or internalism in fending off the
present challenge.
If this is right, I must amend my earlier hypothesis. If the expressivist is to
explain the univocality of “ought” in terms of the expression of conative
attitudes, she must posit that “ought” expresses the same type of conative
attitude when it is relativized to varieties of normativity; but once she posits
that, no matter how we fill in the details we encounter a general problem in
explaining inconsistency because attitudinal inconsistency is too coarse-
grained. The expressivist can avoid both horns of the dilemma by adopting
a pragmatic view that accepts, but does not explain, the univocality of
“ought”: but by doing so, she fails to deliver on a central motivation for
expressivism (anti-realism).
48 Ridge (2014), p. 103, emphasis added.
49 See Copp (2001), Strandberg (2011), and Plunkett and Sundell (2013).
50 This “quasi-expressivist” strategy is extensively developed by Finlay (2014).
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11.7 CONCLUSION
Expressivism, as Yalcin noted, has been unmoored from linguistic phenom-
ena. So the best way to determine whether there is a plausible expressivist
program, and if so what that program should be, is to focus on neglected
linguistic phenomena, like the relativization of “ought” to different
standards.
This phenomenon poses a novel challenge to expressivism. Does “ought”
express the same type of conative state when relativized to different standards?
If so, expressivists struggle to explain inconsistency. If not, expressivists
struggle to deliver a plausible explanation of the univocal meaning of “ought.”
It’s too early to tell whether some form of expressivism survives this
challenge without abandoning all anti-realist ambitions. My main aim has
been to throw down a gauntlet. The expressivist still owes us an account of
the semantic character (rather than content) of “ought.” We are yet to see
how she can either rival or adopt the truth-conditional first-order semantic
theories that take the character of “ought” to mean some function from
contexts to contents. We’re used to hearing the mantra that everything
descriptivists do, expressivists can do cheaper. For the expressivist to deliver
on that front, she must show how she can explain the univocality of “ought”
in terms of the expression of a type of conative attitude that has sufficiently
fine-grained inconsistency conditions.
Aside from this challenge to expressivism, I hope to have shed light on the
methodological point with which we began. It is fine to ask questions about
the meaning of fragments of natural language considered in isolation. But
since we do not use those fragments in isolation, we must not lose sight of
the bigger picture. We must ask how those fragments fit together. Like
everyone else, the expressivist owes us an explanation not just of moral
language, but of how the open-ended set of varieties of normativity fit
together. In other words, everyone—including expressivists of all stripes—
must explain the deep continuities between uses of deontic modals that are
relativized to different varieties of normativity.51
51 I am deeply grateful to the many people who offered extensive feedback and
assistance with this chapter: Matthew Chrisman, Jonathan Dancy, Jan Dowell, Max
Etchemendy, Daniel Fogal, Sukaina Hirji, Eric Hubble, Jeffrey Kaplan, Sebastian Koeh-
ler, Adam Lerner, Sarah McGrath, Tristram McPherson, Philip Pettit, Sam Preston,
Michael Ridge, Gideon Rosen, Michael Smith, Lindsay Whittaker, Jack Woods, two
anonymous referees, and audiences at ANU, Edinburgh, NYU, Princeton, and UNC
Chapel Hill.
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